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ON THE LEGALITY AND
MORALITY OF
PHYSICIAN-AsSISTED
SUICIDE
DAVID J. BAGGETT

There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging
whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question
of philosophy. - Albert Camus

In the state of Michigan, a battle is raging over the activity of Dr. Jack
Kevorkian. A former pathologist, he began medically assisting suicides in 1990
to enable suffering, terminally ill patients to end their lives. In March 1993, the
Michigan state legislature banned assisted suicides, a law specifically aimed at
Kevorkian. What is happening in Michigan, largely inspired by the furor surrounding "Dr. Death," is a microcosm of things to corne in the United States.
The scenario in Michigan concerning physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or medicide is not new, but has been fanning the flames of the debate elsewhere over
this practice, a debate that will undoubtedly in time take on national and international proportions. The Hemlock Society, which promotes the legalization of
PAS for the terminally ill, has upwards of 50,000 members, and recently two
states voted down "right to die" initiatives by only narrow margins. l
More and more people are corning to believe that it is their right to end their
lives when they wish by this intentional means. If assistance from a doctor is
required, the doctor should not be punished. PAS, so the argument goes, should
not be legally banned. Those who oppose the legalization of PAS and thereby
support the banning of it, on the other hand, claim that the state would make a
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mistake if it does not take a stand against it, and inaction would establish a dangerous
precedent by essentially sanctioning the deliberate taking of life.
PAS obviously transcends the scope of Kevorkian and his lawyer, Geoffrey Fieger.
A more thorough treatment would engage the more thoughtful Dr. Timothy Quill,
author of Death and Dignity: Making Choices and Taking Charge. However, since
Kevorkian and Fieger represent such central figures in this emerging debate, it is
instructive to take them as somewhat paradigmatic of this movement. Kevorkian sees
himself as the leading proponent of an important historical revolution, in which the
taboo surrounding death will finally be removed.
He has apparently received numerous requests for assistance. He screens out many
of them, ostensibly considering only those which meet the following criteria: the
patient must be suffering from a fatal or irremediable condition from which he or she
will never recover, the patient's family must entirely agree, the patient's medical condition must be verifiable by Kevorkian, a psychological consultation when appropriate and the patient must never waver.
In an effort to explore a few of the relevant issues involved in this admittedly
morally ambiguous question, let us critically examine a representative argument in
favor of PAS, which typically goes something like this: People have the right to end
their own lives, and to enlist medical professionals to help, when pain becomes too
great to bear and life's quality is thereby reduced to an unconscionable level. Those,
myself included, who would deny this right are, according to Fieger, religiously motivated fanatics who simply wish to impose their provincial views on others. Three
important issues raised by this stance of PAS supporters are the following: What
should be thought of those religiously motivated opponents of PAS? Is it truly people's right to end their lives when they wish with a doctor's assistance? And is the
rationale of reducing pain sufficient basis on which to risk legalization of PAS?
RELIGIOUS BIAS
What should be thought of religiously motivated opponents of PAS? A large number of the most vocal opponents of PAS are, at some level, religiously motivated.
Among supporters of PAS there has been a concerted effort to capitalize on the religious nature of this resistance. Among the likes of Fieger is a conscious and deliberate
attempt to portray the opponents of PAS as zealous religionists far to the political
right of mainstream America. These fanatical reactionaries, the argument goes,
though unwilling themselves to change, are exceedingly willing to impose their narrow views on others. At the most elementary and obvious level, this effort is an example of the logical fallacy argumentum ad hominem, which assumes that discrediting a
person thereby discredits his or her arguments.
A more legitimate critique of religious motives questions their value in a pluralistic
society. In an age when the wall of separation between church and state is assiduously
maintained, and when the need for tolerance and openness to a broad spectrum of
ideas is emphasized, religion has taken on a pejorative tone in public discourse. The
trend is toward increasingly permissive legislation, including the legalization of PAS,
and personal choice seems to be the dictated conclusion of any social issue involving
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religious conviction. All it takes for an issue to be decided on the basis of personal
choice is the characterization of the debate as religious in character, at which point it is
automatically assumed that nothing more needs to be said. If classical theism or traditional religion is involved, then the question is answered: personal choice has priority.2
Certainly this debate entails more than religious considerations alone. Relevant to
this debate, for instance, are agreed upon nonreligious standards to test consequences. But this debate remains in need of being informed by religion. An issue like
PAS or euthanasia requires societies to decide on a collective moral vision. Christians
in this society have always been passionate players in that process, and those of every
creed must continue to be involved and included. Unfortunately, this culture is
quickly forfeiting its intellectual capacity to acknowledge the relevance of transcendent and religiously based normative moral codes to public discourse. Richard John
Neuhaus, one of today's foremost authorities on religion in contemporary society,
stresses that laws, to retain legitimacy, must be seen to be coherently connected with
basic presuppositions about right and wrong, good and evii.J He warns that morality
becomes mere sentimentality when its religious foundations and theological underpinnings are lost, but recently we have too often uncritically assumed that religiously
based moral concerns can no longer be binding on our public ethic. 4 While that has
taken place, the resultant moral void has simply been dogmatically filled in with other
moral postulates as greedy for transcendence as anything religion can muster. The
public square detests a moral vacuum.
Society's uncritical relegation of religion to a place of irrelevance is having numerous harmful consequences, and those who argue that religious conviction ought to be
a disqualification from the public debate are laboring under fundamental misunderstandings. This bias against religion will not only sustain the dichotomy between the
institutions of church and state, but will drive a wedge between the laws of the land
and religiously rooted moral values. Whenever this happens, potentially positive legislation and constructive influence can be lost simply because they are construed as
too suggestive of religion. Imagine the result if Dietrich Bonhoeffer's opposition to
Hitler, Martin Luther King's battle for equal rights or William Wilberforce's fight
against slavery had been silenced and consigned to irrelevance just because they were
in part spurred by religious conviction.
If the attempt to portray PAS as a legal debate with no room for religion is one
attempt to silence religious resistance to PAS, another attempt is to portray the debate
as a scientific and medical matter. Dr. Kevorkian has said that he will "do what a doctor should do: alleviate the suffering of the human being in front of me if it's justified
medically." Notice that the alleged basis for his actions is medical, not moral. His
lawyer has similarly asserted that it is inappropriate to "inject a matter of faith with a
purely medical and scientific issue." The clear implication is that this debate is a medical and scientific debate alone with no room for religion, faith claims or traditional
morality.
This is confused thinking. By its nature, science alone is not equipped to handle
moral, philosophical or metaphysical inquiry. The debate over PAS involves these
very questions. The insistence that science alone answer the moral questions about
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PAS assumes a mistaken view of what science does. Science deals with the empirically
verifiable and quantifiably measurable, not normative and prescriptive questions of
ethics. Whether anything exists outside science's necessarily truncated vision is not a
question it can answer, nor one it should be expected to answer. The evidence that
science offers concerning our ultimate questions, such as detectable patterns of regularity or the auspicious conditions for human life, is necessarily ambiguous and
inconclusive.
Arguing that theological considerations be bracketed out of this debate is simply
naive at best, patently dishonest at worst. Doctors should not be the only ones doing
medical ethics. Their insights and facts are crucial, but without religious convictions,
logical distinctions and ethical discussions, the prior philosophical and theological
assumptions of doctors may be advanced dogmatically in the name of science and
uncritically accepted. That includes Dr. Kevorkian, who hastens to give primacy to
his own "scientific" moral ideals and expects the laws to live up to those standards,
while those with a "religious" moral vision are supposed to keep quiet and, preferably, out of the public debate.
Likewise, Howard Simon, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union,
concurs with Kevorkian when he claims that opposition to legalizing PAS on theological grounds is illegitimate. Certainly, however, Simon must be aware of his own
gUiding truth claims and ideological biases, such as when he claims, echoing
Kevorkian's sentiments, that "the right to control our own lives ... belongs to each of
us" and "it is my life and the decision should be mine." These are ambitious theological assertions in their own right, as are any fundamental presuppositions which
incline us toward one side of this debate or the other. Simply because his propositions
reflect a "secularistic theology," as it were, does not exempt them from scrutiny. And
just because the assumptions of some are fueled by religious conviction and tempered
by traditional morality does not mean they ought to be decried.
As a society we are fast losing our language for moral discourse. And by ruling out
of court as irrelevant any religious morality, a great historical source of our public
ethos in this country, we are now more and more refusing to contend with the complexities of ethical conundrums. The probable basis on which an issue like PAS will
eventually be decided will be very narrow, and it will likely be this: PAS safeguards
our rights, while a law against it would reduce our freedoms. Is that the extent of collective moral imagination and discussion of which this culture is capable?
RIGHT TO DIE
In the fall of 1993, my father suffered and died from an acute case of lymphoblastic leukemia. In his final weeks, his condition deteriorated daily. The final two weeks
rendered him unconscious much of the time, delirious and disoriented from the
cumulative effect of chemotherapy, internal hemorrhaging, the cancer itself and the
several medications being administered. When his time of death arrived, the family
had already done much of their mourning. Seeing him dying like that seemed worse
than the actual death itself.
My father's suffering could have been worse. It certainly could have been better,
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but it could have been substantially worse in terms of intensity and duration. As my
father suffered and my family suffered along with him, I thought about physicianassisted suicide at times. I was not giving it serious consideration in this case, but was
attempting to understand its appeal in the lives of those who have had to endure prolonged periods of suffering. It is not difficult to see why a relatively painless and
immediate death can seem so much better than continuing in horrendous pain
(though modern palliatives make such cases rare).
But I hesitate affirming a legislative sanction of physician-assisted suicide. Among
my reservations is a serious concern over the way rights language has been employed
in this debate, sometimes clouding the issues considerably and avoiding important
questions altogether. In this section I would like to discuss this rights language in
moral discourse generally and in the PAS debate particularly, pointing out a few of
the limitations, assumptions, and implications of its common usage.
Supporters of PAS submit that it protects the "right to die" of human beings. The
point they are stressing is people's right to die when they choose to die. Expressed less
euphemistically, those like Kevorkian and Fieger are asserting people's right to kill
themselves and to enlist others' help when required. It is not simply the negative right
of refusing life-preserving treatment, but the positive, legislatively sanctioned right of
officially assisted suicide. That people have the right to commit suicide, even with the
help of a licensed health care professional, is becoming an accepted moral postulate,
increasingly treated as a self-evident proposition, within the conventional wisdom
and reigning "plausibility structures" of this culture. It is usually stated dogmatically,
thereby begging a most important question of this debate: Is suicide our right, and
does it include the right to enlist the assistance of others?
The assumption that moral debates can be reduced to the level of rights is widespread, a trend concerning which I hold some reservations. I should therefore quickly
preface this discussion by stressing that I am not yet convinced of the validity and
soundness of the arguments in favor of conducting moral dialogue exclusively (or
even primarily) in rights language. Such discourse typically assumes that the world is
constituted under adversarial power structures and attempts to construct an individualistic approach to ethics, while yielding conclusions far-reaching and communal in
scope. Rights do not exist in a vacuum, not even private rights, for to assert a right is
also to impose an obligation on our society to provide means for the exercise of that
right. Rather than reinforcing individualism when a private right is societally
affirmed, that society incurs upon itself at the moment of legislation the obligation to
provide the suitable means for its citizens to enjoy that right.
That the question of rights has generally come to be seen as the legitimate focus of
the PAS debate is undeniable, however. Interestingly, both sides of the debate often
employ rights language. The Hemlock Society, which promotes the legalization of
PAS for the terminally ill, speaks of a "right to die," while their strongest opponents
are typically self-avowed "right to life" proponents. The present ban against PAS in
my home state of Michigan was temporarily repealed when Judge Cynthia Stephens
decided that "the right of self-determination includes the right to choose to cease living." By some estimates, about eighty percent of the population of the state of
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Michigan believe that human beings possess a "right to die" and that legislation sanctioning PAS ought to be adopted. This figure is usually reflected among my philosophy students at the university where I teach, with about four out of five initially
affirming PAS because "that's our right."
An important reason why one's right to die is often uncritically accepted today is
this society's cultural climate. It is a culture averse to imposition. Since anything that
smacks of imposition is anathema, the banning of PAS has an inherent strike against
it from the outset. By its nature, it is a nonpermissive law and is thus characterized by
its opponents as an imposition of religious values and an infringement of rights.
Within our contemporary moral context, where primacy is often given to individual
and private rights, it is small wonder that PAS is finding an increasingly receptive
audience. Considered carefully, this cultural climate offers little reason to assume that
suicide is indeed our right. It certainly helps explain why rhetoric appealing to rights
language in the PAS debate is effective persuasion for so many, but the prior question
of whether suicide is indeed a right has still not been answered.
The swelling popular conviction that suicide is a right has usually resulted less
from good reasons and logical arguments than from a brute assumption being
absorbed into the working mentality of our culture. When pressed, one reason that
may be offered for such a right is that suicide as an option is an implication of human
freedom. We possess a free will with which we can justifiably make our own decisions
about our lives, it is argued. This rationale, though, is clearly inadequate, confusing
free will with other types of freedom, and assuming that what we can freely choose of
our own volition should necessarily be politically, ethically, and legally permissible.
Quite obviously that is not the case. Something which we possess the capability of
doing is not thereby a right. Libertarian freedom, if it exists in the face of the challenge of determinism, implies neither political freedom nor moral license necessarily.
It may be suggested that a right to die can be gleaned from the Karen Ann Quinlan
case and subsequent rulings which have established the right under certain circumstances to be disconnected from artificial life support systems. This procedure has
come to be known as passive euthanasia, allowing death to take place naturally.
Justice Scalia, in the Nancy Beth Cruzan decision, equated the termination of life support with ordinary suicide, collapsing any distinction between passive euthanasia and
PAS. However, it does good to recall that Scalia was the only justice to do so. The
assertion that denial of life-saving medical treatment by a competent patient constitutes suicide has been largely rejected logically and legally, and for good reason.
Suicide involves active steps taken to induce death, while passive euthanasia affirms
the causality of the underlying disease as the agency of a person's death. The
Michigan ban on PAS that has been alternately legislated and struck down specifically
distinguishes PAS from "withholding or withdrawing medical treatment."
Some opponents of PAS strongly support passive euthanasia for. similar reasons
they oppose PAS. As my father's condition worsened, the family had to make a decision regarding his "code status." As an opponent of PAS, I was also a strong voice in
support of declaring my father's status "no code." That meant, in case of cardiac
arrest, for instance, he would not be resuscitated. Doctors and nurses would have
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made pain management and comfort care their priority, not the prolonging of his life
at any cost. With everything else my father had experienced in recent years medically,
and now with him suffering from a fatal disease, I and my family decided that it was
time to draw the line in terms of how much we could reasonably expect medicine to
do. PAS supporters neglect doing this, it seems, believing that a doctor's obligation is
not only to prolong life and minimize pain, but to help in the taking of life when all
else fails. The lesson to learn from vexing moral dilemmas introduced by too great a
faith in medicine is to draw the line earlier, placing less trust in medicine, not to
expect medicine to solve the problem that it has helped create (usually at the insistence of patients' families).
Some suggest that a right to die is presupposed in ongoing medical techniques.
Such a challenge attempts to blunt distinctions between PAS and what is already
accepted medical practice. In attempting to alleviate pain, doctors often administer
substantial doses of analgesics and, in doing so, sometimes hasten death. One of the
points of resistance to laws against PAS in the medical profession is concern that such
laws may impede current medical procedures. However, a traditionally honored distinction can be upheld by means of the doctrine of double effect, traceable to Aquinas.
This distinction points out the difference between primary and secondary effects,
arguing that culpability not be extended to secondary effects unintended by our
actions. Substantial doses of palliative therapies requested by patients may occasionally hasten death, but death in such cases is an inadvertent effect of the primary goal of
pain relief. PAS intentionally induces death rather-than secondarily and inadvertently
effecting it, distinguishing PAS from ambitious palliative therapy.s
Suppose this suggestion: suicide is at least our legal right since so many states have
struck down legislation making it illegal. In response, I would ask this question: Does
the absence of legislation against suicide make it our right? Perhaps another important reason for not making suicide illegal other than the desire to provide its sanction
is that criminal punishment is Virtually ineffectual as a deterrent to suicide. In this
case, another reason is obvious: there is no way to punish a successful victim of suicide! The fact that a law against suicide cannot be enforced does little to confirm suicide as our right, particularly given this culture's formal efforts to avoid suicide. If suicide has been given our blessing, why have state legislatures found it in the public
interest to dissuade such behavior by funding ambitious suicide prevention programs
and forbidding assisting in a suicide?
To call our presumed right to die into question almost seems a waste of time, but it
happens to be that little piece of question-begging with which many opponents of
PAS have to differ. This alleged right usually functions as the crucial unquestioned
premise in the argument for PAS, without which the argument fails. To say "I have a
right to end my life when I wish" is easy, while testing the legitimacy of such a claim
becomes more involved. We are driven to foundational questions about communal
responsibilities, limitations on personal rights, the significance of death and the
appropriateness of suicide.
What exactly is meant by saying that we have this moral right to choose when to
die? A right is something one is entitled to, that to which one has a just and proper
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claim, and implies a principle of congruity and appropriateness. It is something apposite to us. The rights a society argues for thereby reveal its anthropology; the basic
human, moral, legal rights a society believes it possesses reflect what it thinks of
humanity. The rights people actually possess are dictated by the true nature of humanity, which mayor may not be accurately reflected in what a society believes. The discussion of anthropology concerning human nature is prior to the decision about
human rights, and has to take place at the level of worldview.
Representatives from a broad array of worldviews are encouraged to enter the public debate over PAS and voice their convictions and concerns. They are at liberty to
convince the populace of the wisdom or compassion of PAS, or lack thereof, by the
power of their ideas and cogency of their arguments. This courtesy should be extended to the spectrum of worldviews, from theists and atheists to existentialists, Kantians
and humanists. The debate over PAS features an appeal to our ultimate commitments,
our most basic ethical convictions and most deeply cherished values. Satisfactorily
answering whether or not we as a culture wish to affirm that suicide is a basic and
fundamental right requires the participation of everyone, the formation of a consensus and the clearest and best of arguments all around.
The dogma that people have the right to end their lives when they so choose presupposes a humanistic understanding, according to which human beings are the masters of
their own destiny, entirely autonomous and independent. This approach should not be
exempt in the public arena from the same critical scrutiny rightly aimed at all other possible worldviews. In contrast to humanists, theists often question those Homo sapiencentered assumptions, positing instead that humankind is God's creation, and as created
beings, essentially dependent on God, they are subject to God's sovereignty. According to
most theistic conceptions of humanity, no such right to commit suicide exists. Such a
right would usurp God's authority, exceed the prerogatives of human freedom and violate the prohibition against murder that the Judeo-Christian ethic, for instance, teachesan ethic that has long served to inform public discourse in this culture.
This culture can discard such theistic perspectives as archaic and outdated if it will;
the question is whether it should. To assume that all traditional moral convictions are
necessarily inferior to the "liberated" ethics of today is potentially the apex of arrogance, an instance of what has been called "chronological snobbery."
Unlike life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of Independence,
suicide is usually not touted as an unalienable right with which we have been endowed
by our Creator. Kevorkian certainly would not attribute such a right to God; his worldview is succinctly put in his answer to the question of what happens to us after we die:
"You rot." Assuming human rights are either intrinsic or conferred, then, that would
leave the so-called right to die as a necessary part of humanity or personhood. Those
who are inclined to deny such a right, on the other hand, see PAS as contrary to human
nature. Theists generally assume that the wisdom of God's moral laws is evident in the
way they accord with both nature in general and human nature in particular.
Those truly individualistic impulses and instincts not to be denied within us usually do not have to do with our rights so much as with our natural desire as human
beings to survive.]. Gay-Williams, reflecting on euthanasia, has argued that
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Every human being has a natural inclination to continue living. Our reflexes
and responses fit us to fight attackers, flee wild animals, and dodge out of the
way of trucks. In our daily lives we exercise the caution and care necessary to
protect ourselves. Our bodies are similarly structured for survival right down to
the molecular level. When we are cut, our capillaries seal shut, our blood clots,
and fibrogen is produced to start the process of healing the wound. When we
are invaded by bacteria, antibodies are produced to fight against the alien organisms, and their remains are swept out of the body by special cells designed for
clean up work.
It is enough, I believe, to recognize that the organization of the human body
and our patterns of behavioral responses make the continuation of life a natural
goal. By reason alone, then, we can recognize that euthanasia sets us against our
own nature .... Euthanasia involves acting as if this dual nature-inclination
towards survival and awareness of this as an end-did not exist. Thus, euthanasia denies our basic human character and requires that we regard ourselves or
others as something less than fully human. Euthanasia does violence to this natural goal of survival. 6

This innate desire we have to preserve and sustain life has long been encapsulated
in the Hippocratic Oath doctors take. Euthanasia and PAS violate the natural inclination people have to preserve life and safeguard society. Deep within us are a desire
and sense of responsibility to heed our will to live and thereby cultivate the fabric of
society rather than to militate against and undercut that through an individualistic
warrant for suicide. How do proponents of PAS justify their exclusively individualistic
orientation when faced with the inherent sense of social responsibility that we all feel
and that most all cultures have cherished?
It suffices to say that the right to die, a crucial premise in the case for PAS, does
not deserve its status as an unapproachable, unassailable verity. In fact it is but one
dubious tenet among others in a worldview that claims an exalted view of
humankind, but which actually leaves an ever decreasing set of safeguards in place for
the innocent and most helpless of the species. Opponents of PAS seriously question
whether the arena of death is one in which finite human beings exercise legitimate
and exclusive autonomy. The words of Gloucester from King Lear still ring clear: "We
must endure our going hence even as our coming hither."
SLIPPERY SLOPE
If this society decides to legalize PAS, it will institutionalize a certain rejection of
the prohibition against murder by sanctioning assistance in self-murder. Such a decision will largely be based on an act-utilitarian ethic contending that the elements that
make an act right or wrong are not the intrinsic features of the act, but the consequences of the act. Assisted self-murder will be legalized in certain cases because in
those cases the ends will have been deemed to justify the means. Rather than a rulebased orientation, utilitarianism will have become the dominant ethical approach of
the legislators, at least in the case of PAS. The opinion of many people is that it is
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high time for this transition to take place, and for utilitarianism to be accorded its
special place of honor in the formation of our public ethic.
Act-utilitarianism remains a problematic method of formulating a public ethic,
however, because an exclusive regard for each action's consequences, over against
general prima Jacie rights and wrongs, makes today's legislative decisions a major, not
to mention laborious, guessing game. Decisions which are made to minimize suffering, given the limited knowledge and perspective we have, may turn out tomorrow to
have been entirely mistaken, a notorious epistemological difficulty of utilitarianism.
What goes especially unquestioned is whether the utilitarian denial of ethical norms
is a prudent way in which to achieve the best of consequences.
Often overlooked is the fact that adherents of traditional rule-based ethics are usually at least as concerned with the consequences of actions as utilitarians are, sometimes more so. Although traditionalists believe in the existence of objective moral
standards, they also happen to be convinced that it is the faithful following of those
ethical norms, in general, by which the overall best consequences are finally secured
for all concerned. 7 According to this understanding, the deleterious consequences of
an immoral action are not merely an incidental effect but a manifestation of the
action's ethically deficient nature, a function or an internal component of evil, if you
will. An intimate relationship thus operates between an action's intrinsic moral features and its ultimate consequences, so that certain behavior is not wrong simply
because it results in hurt, but rather it often results in harm because it is actually bad.
A society which institutionalizes the rejection of an inherently right moral precept or
principle, or embraces a wrong one, places itself at a grave risk to reap the destructive
whirlwind of consequences which will invariably flow out of that decision. s
This analysis can be applied to PAS in a most socially relevant fashion. On ruleutilitarian grounds alone, if it could be effectively argued that the legalization of PAS
could and most probably would have devastating results, that alone should be a sufficient reason to ban it. Alleged rights, such as suicide, have been denied to exist in the
past when they were perceived to be inherently wrong and such restrictive legislation
was deemed to serve the public interest. Certain rights are also denied to exist when
their probable result would be the fundamental undermining of a culture.
Government has the responsibility to impose legitimate limitations on personal freedoms when necessary to safeguard the welfare of a society.
Many attempts have been made to delineate the potential harmful effects of
euthanasia and PAS. These are arguments which appeal to what is called a "slippery
slope." The idea behind such arguments is that once we have started down an incline,
by legalizing PAS for instance, there is no putting a stop to the momentum of the
resultant downward motion. Some would call such reasoning fallacious, as some
appeals to slippery slope arguments against PAS undoubtedly are, some being mere
"scare tactics." However, not all of them are, and the fact is that legitimate concerns
exist over the kind of precedent the legalization of PAS would set.
It is far from my intention to provide an exhaustive catalogue of all the possible
negative consequences of legalizing PAS. A few that others have elaborated on include
the possible decline in overall medical care, the corruption of medical practice, dam-
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age to patients' confidence in physicians, the prospect of PAS becoming the only feasible medical "treatment" for the poor, the making of killing increasingly acceptable
and routine and the extension of PAS to include the chronically depressed or those
who simply feel useless or like a burden (note the dehumanizing connotations in
such labels as "useless" or "burden").
Such speculations and conjectures about worst-case scenarios after the legalization
of PAS are often dismissed categorically by avid PAS supporters. However, it is they
themselves who have chosen consequentialism as the most reliable route for finding
the right public policy. If they are true to their principles, they should be as concerned with the potentially damaging results of legalizing PAS as anyone. Their natural rejoinder is that they endorse legalization only under clear restrictions and guidelines which would regulate the practice and minimize harmful effects or abuses.
The logic of PAS itself defies such regulation, however. For if suicide is a right
intrinsic to human nature, with what substantive justification can we discourage suicide for any reason whatsoever? When human autonomy justifies PAS, as a growing
portion of this society believes, then any competent person is accorded the "privilege." The lesson will be conveyed through the legalization of PAS that suicide is the
proper, or at least a legitimate, response to a life subjectively and individually deemed
below an acceptable quality level. Suicide could well become the epidemic result of
this implicit societal teaching, and it would not be long before the integrity of the
whole culture could be seriously violated. Teenagers, among whom suicide is already
rampant, would essentially be issued a societal sanction to opt for suicide rather than
enduring their temporal troubles. The suicide rate today among the elderly has
already surpassed that of teenagers, a tragedy that would be only exacerbated by PAS.
Another portion of this culture's population considers mercy, not autonomy, to be
the salient rationale for PAS, the more utilitarian oriented basis. But once we have formally substituted the importance of the quality of life as we judge it for the importance and dignity of life itself, how can we impose a limit on the logical implications
and practical ramifications of such a decision? On what nonarbitrary grounds can we
continue to uphold even those screening criteria of Kevorkian's? How can we withhold death from those most in need of it just because they are no longer competent to
assert their wishes? Once we lift up the immediate reduction of pain or, even better,
its total elimination as the supreme virtue and sublimest goal of our public ethos,
does PAS become not only the privilege but the mandate? Do we not confer upon
ourselves an ever-increasing responsibility to resolve pain by bringing about death?
Pain is not only part of dying, it is part of living.
If PAS by nature is beyond regulation, ItOW is the time for us to realize that. After
medicide is characterized as a right, no reversal of course is realistic, no matter how
painful the path we traverse. Any attempt to do so would simply produce an outcry of
protest, just the way prohibition did or a repeal of abortion rights would today. Once
legislatively affirmed and societally appropriated, rights become entrenched in our
mindset and practically impossible to remove.
Precedent, the crucible of experience, shows the ease with which PAS leads to voluntary active euthanasia and, eventually, to involuntary active euthanasia, including
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the physically disabled, the mentally incompetent and those too expensive to treat. In
Holland, where PAS has been officially tolerated, three percent of all deaths are now
directly caused by doctors. That percentage would translate into over 60,000 deaths
caused annually by doctors in this country.9 What is more, Dutch physicians are now
performing more than two times more involuntary euthanasia than voluntary, an
unpalatable statistic for the empirically minded utilitarian to swallow.1O A 1991 study
found that in one year more than 1,000 Dutch patients incapable of giving consent
died at the hands of their doctors, demonstrating that PAS resides at the threshold of
euthanasia, another terrifying slippery slope. II
Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop writes
I am convinced that in the 1930s the German medical sentiment favoring
euthanasia (even before Hitler came to power) made it easier for the Nazi government to move society along that slippery slope that led to the Holocaust. The
German euthanasia movement started with defective babies, then reached out to
eliminate the insane, then to those suffering from senile dementia, then to patients
with advanced tuberculoses, to amputees deemed of no further service to the
Reich, to Gypsies, to Poles, and finally to Jews. The Holocaust was upon us. 12
PAS essentially involves a contract between a patient and his doctor for a service to
be rendered that will culminate in one party in the contract dying. Even though this
may be a contract between only two people, it has become a public, communal agreement, not merely a private decision expressive of individual autonomy. It is a form of
spcial action, asserts Daniel Callahan, the director and co-founder of the Hastings
Center and author, most recently, of The Troubled Dream oj Life. It thus functions at the
heart of this culture's social ethic, the glue which holds this diverse country and democratic experiment together. If PAS is legalized, it will dramatically alter the content of our
public ethos, becoming part of the social framework of the citizens left behind.
In my father's final weeks, the family pitched in to be with him around the clock,
attending to his needs, changing his sheets, feeding him ice. Undoubtedly he was
experiencing pain at times, sometimes severely, though usually only temporarily. My
father was also forced to endure some humiliation, being utterly dependent on either
family or nurses to help with uncontrolled bodily discharges, for instance. During
that time, echoing through my mind was the rhetoric I had heard in favor of PAS,
usually wrapped in rights language: "We have a right to die with dignity." Such language seems to imply that pain or dependence on others robs us of dignity. In contrast, though, looking at my father, I did not feel that way. Yes, my dad experienced
pain, so we tried desperately to find the right pain medication to help. And he was
dependent on us, even to the point of being a burden on us. But the family would not
have had it any other way. We genUinely felt and believed that mutual burden-sharing
was part of what being a family was all about, and part of what being communal
beings was about. Our respect for our father only increased through the difficult
episode; at least in our minds he never lacked any dignity. On the contrary, his willingness to lean on our strength and compassion demonstrated a profound depth of
character and inner grace.
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Did my father lack dignity in his own mind? It is difficult to say, since he was
rather noncommunicative in his final weeks. This much is clear, though: suicide for
him simply was not a living option. It was not a category he thought in terms of, nor
was it part of his intellectual furniture. At least one reason for that was this society's
social ethic, which has not yet formally projected suicide as a legitimate response to a
life deemed below an acceptable quality level. I could not help but watch my dad and
wonder how it might have been different had suicide already become part of the intellectual framework and moral mentality of this society. When the pain was intense and
his care increased, would he have considered himself obligated to request an earlier
assisted death after seeing the strain that his dying put on the family? Would he have
felt so burdensome that he felt obliged to hasten his own death?
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Being witness to such a heartwrenching, anguishing experience as my father's
death, I am reminded that to speak of issues of death, dying, and human suffering is a
task that requires tremendous sensitivity and compassion. This is no mere academic
exercise alone, but something vitally at the heart of the human condition, rife with
human emotion and practical import. Though I sometimes fail, I attempt to tread this
ground gingerly, hoping that my comments may resonate with both the intellectually
honest and the emotionally sensitive, even if my readers do not entirely concur with
my tentative conclusions or sympathize with my concerns.
This essay has attempted to carve out an important niche in the public debate for
religiously motivated opponents of the practice of PAS, to call into question the widely assumed "right to die" of human beings and to make mention of some potential
negative results of legalizing PAS. It has been my guiding premise that PAS and
euthanasia are morally bankrupt and legally imprudent, and now I will offer a few
additional reflections and provisional conclusions.
Rights language introduces many questions. Does such individualistic language
underestimate the scope of its communal implications? Has such language extinguished categories like responsibility and virtue? Is it adequate to handle morally
ambiguous cases like PAS? Does it often beg important prior questions like the prerogatives of human freedom and the essence of human nature? Does such language,
as compelling as it may seem, merely skate on the surface of deeply philosophical,
metaphysical, and moral issues?
The legalization of PAS would ensure that a significant shift takes place in the public attitude toward suicide. Logically, legally, and ethically, that would be the
inevitable result. The ACLU, the organization fighting for PAS only with procedural
safeguards in place, will be the same organization arguing tomorrow for the unconstitutionality of any safeguards they help institute today. If anyone doubts that, think for
a moment how often the ACLU has helped the cause of any thoughtful regulation on
abortion laws. Slippery slope arguments only constitute fallacies when the relationship between alleged causes and dramatic results is not clearly enough established.
Concern over the consequences of legalizing PAS is well warranted, given the nature
and content of such legislation. Regulatory guidelines would soon be seen as arbi-
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trary, inviting covert evasion or blatant rejection, as the logic of PAS inexorably
comes to fruition. As Christians we are being remiss when we do not express our
strongest reservations about such an unwise and far-reaching law as PAS, which
would be based on a relatively few truly "hard cases" that remind us that our best
energies as a community are spent supporting the hospice movement, loving and supporting suffering patients and working toward even better pain control.
The laws of our democracy invariably reflect the moral convictions of the majority,
whether the majority is right or wrong. If the echoes of public support for PAS reverberate into a mighty shout, the legislators are sure to hear and heed. PAS could very
well become a salient feature of the social, economic, and political landscape of this
society entering the twenty-first century: an expansive, decreasingly discriminatory,
profit-driven enterprise offering suicide as one more "service" to be sought at a bargain. What might enhance the likelihood of this happening is Kevorkian's promise
not to eat as long as he is imprisoned for breaking the new law. In effect, he argues,
the state will then be assisting his suicide, and in that scenario he may well become
something of a martyr and catalyst for the cause.
Meanwhile, the Christian Church should use its freedom to voice its concerns in a
winsome and compelling manner, credibly and intelligently finding ways to influence
the outcome of the public debate. Without claiming perfect discernment of God's will,
we should willingly participate in discussing this dilemma, listening sensitively to
those who disagree with us, becoming informed about the relevant issues to be
addressed and questions to be asked and playing our own special part in the whole
process. Lovers of God and humankind, committed to objective truth and normative
morality, should not remain silent and uninvolved when they see their culture buy
into the fleeting and misguided values of humanistic philosophy.
As the Church stresses its views on PAS, Christians should also remain insightfully
aware of the need for harmony and integrity within and among all of their own various beliefs. Can Christians continue reconciling consistent opposition to PAS and
euthanasia with inconsistent opposition to abortion or war? Can Christians justify
opposing PAS if they support capital punishment? The earliest Christian communities
were consistently "pro-life." They were pacifists who were firmly opposed to capital
punishment, abortion, and suicide of any kind. Philosopher James Rachels's contention sounds reasonable that Christianity's eventual concession on issues like war
and capital punishment, tempering its earlier radical stand, was but a politically expedient compromise, not something theologically and exegetically derived. Today
Christians must be willing to think through their opposition to PAS, and to follow
again their logic and convictions to their natural conclusions. I am convinced that the
most logically and theologically consistent view for Christians opposed to the legalization of PAS is to be additionally opposed to war, capital punishment and abortion,
though I know thoughtful Christians who disagree with me.
Assuming PAS is officially sanctioned here one day, then the Church will be faced
with having to work on this issue more from the bottom up than from the top down,
not unlike what has happened with abortion. What makes this appropriate is that
being a Christian means not only that we believe rightly as individuals, but that we
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have been baptized into a community with a certain set of beliefs, practices, and
morals, offering an alternative ethos to that of the world. It is relatively easy to stand
against the legalization of abortion or euthanasia, and even to extol the virtues of the
necessary sacrifices of bringing an unwanted pregnancy to term or of living until
nature takes its course. But it is much more challenging, yet arguably closer to the
heart of Christ, for the Church to reach out in love to the unwed mother or the suffering patient and provide for their needs to help them cope with their situations, so in
desperation they do not resort to abortion or PAS. It is not the duty of the Church
simply to engage in ethical debate and to battle laws against PAS, but to reach out to
the suffering and needy, offering a cup of cold water and lending a sympathetic ear, to
help convey a sense of meaning and impart a will to persevere to those who feel most
like giving up.13
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